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THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE AND APPELLATE REVIEW
OF DISCOVERY ORDERS IN NEBRASKA

In Lund v. Holbrook1 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
no appeal could be taken until after final judgment from an order
requiring a party to turn over documents to his opponent for
inspection and copying. The basis for the decision was a statute
limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court to the review of a "judgment rendered or final order."2 "Final order"
is defined by statute as one which " ... in effect determines the
action and prevents a judgment."3 The same rule would undoubtedly by applied to any other discovery order in Nebraska.
This "final judgment" rule exists in some form in almost
every state.4 The application of the rule in Lund v. Holbrook is

1157 Neb. 854, 63 N.W.2d 112 (1954).
2Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 1948). The same provision is
made as to the appellate jurisdiction of the district court on appeal from
the "county court, justice of the peace, or any other tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions, and inferior in jurisdiction to the
district court. . . . " Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1901 (Reissue 1948).
a Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1948).
4 New Hampshire appears to be the only state which does not have
the final judgment rule. See discussion in Glover v. Baker, 76 N.H. 261,
81 Atl. 1081, 1082 (1911) where the court says, "The theory that questions of law could be finally determined only by a writ of error after final
judgment has been so long abandoned as to be practically unknown to
practitioners at this bar."
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in line with the rulings of the majority of states as to discovery
orders. 5 The purpose of the rule is to reduce the volume of appeals
which would, in the absence of the rule, clog the calendars of appellate courts and cause interminable delay in litigation.6
Many states have modified the final judgment rule by statute to allow immediate appeal from specified orders which are
not reviewable under the majority rule until after final judgment.
The reason for these modifications may be either that the final
judgment rule does not fulfill its puropses, or that the assumption underlying the rule (i.e., that the effect of any error on the
part of the trial court can be remedied by a new trial) has proved
to be untrue.
The decision in Lund v. Holbrook7 illustrates another type
of order, the discovery order, which may be worthy of consideration as justifying a departure from the final judgment rule.
We propose to examine:
(a) the effect of the final judgment rule in cases involving
discovery orders, to determine whether departure from the final
judgment rule is justified,
(b) the means presently existing in Nebraska for avoiding
the effect of the final judgment rule as to discovery orders, and
(c) the desirability of, and possibilities for statutory modification of the final judgment rule as to discovery orders in Nebraska.
I.

THE EFFECT OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE IN
DISCOVERY CASES

A. Types of Discovery Procedures.
Nebraska procedure provides several means by which a party
may elicit information from other persons before trial. These
procedures may be used either by plaintiffs or defendants. Some
may be used only against parties, and some may be used against
any person having the desired information. Disclosure of " . . .
See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 586 (1954).
See Note, 58 Yale L.J. 1186 (1949) and cases cited therein. Crick,
The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539 (1932) concludes that the desire of appellate courts to prevent being swamped with
appeals ls the policy underlying the final judgment rule, but the authorities cited therein seem to support equally well the proposition that the
purposes of the rule include the prevention of delay and expense to litigants.
7 157 Neb. 854, 62 N.W.2d 112 (1954).
SNeb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.02 (Supp. 1955).
5

6
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any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action. . . ." may be required.8 It is no
objection that the matter sought to be discovered would not be
admissible at the trial if it appears ". . . reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 9
The one discovery procedure usable against either parties or
non-parties is the taking of depositions.10 Depositions may be
taken either upon oral examination or upon written interrogatories.11 Subpoenas may be issued to require the attendance of
witnesses, and subpoenas may be issued to require the attendance
of witnesses, and subpoenas duces tecum may be used to require
witnesses to produce documents and other material evidence.12
Notice to adverse parties is required for the taking of all depositions,13 but leave of court is required only if the notice of taking
the deposition is to be served by the plaintiff within twenty days
after the commencement of the action.14
The remaining discovery procedures may be used only against
parties. Notice and a showing of "good cause" are required before the court will enter orders requiring parties to produce documents for inspection and copying,15 permit entry on land,1G or
submit to mental or physical examination.17 Other procedures
which may be used only against parties are requests for admission
of facts and the genuineness of documents, and written interrogatories, for both of which answers must be served in writing.
Notice is not required for this procedure, and leave of court is
required only if the requests or interrogatories are made within
ten days after commencement of action.18
Upon the failure of a party or witness to answer a question
on a deposition, the court may enter an order requiring the de-

9

Ibid.

10 Id.
11 Id.

§ 25-1267 .01.
§ 25-1267.01.
12 Id. § 25-1267.01 (". . . The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as proided by law."); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-

1224 (Reissue 1948) ("The subpoena . . . may contain a clause directing
a witness to bring with him any book, writing or other thing under his
control, which he is bound by law to produce as evidence.").
13 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.20 (Supp. 1955).
14 Id. § 25-1267.01.
15 Id. § 25-1267.39.
16 Id. § 25-1267.39.
17 Id. § 25-1267.40.
18 Id. §§ 25-1267.37, 25-1267.41.
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ponent to answer.19 We will speak of this type of order, together
with the other orders described above, as discovery orders, as
distinguished from orders entered to compel compliance with
them.20 The orders compelling compliance we will speak of as
discovery "sanctions."

B. Possibilities of Harm from the Operation of Discover Orders
It is suggested above that discovery orders may be worthy
of consideration as presenting reasons for a modification of the
final judgment rule. The reasons we speak of are based on the
possibilities of serious harm to parties or witnesses arising out
of the operation of discovery procedures. vVe proceed to discuss
these reasons.
1.

Delay and Expense Caused by the Final Judgment Rule.

The usual procedure for correcting errors committed by a
trial court is a retrial of the case, after an appeal from final judgment and a decision by the appellate court that the error was
prejudicial. The procedure may involve, for both parties, the
considerable delay and expense required for a new trial, which
might have been made unnecessary by an interlocutory appeal
before final judgment. The delay and expense of an interlocutory
appeal may, however, be just as great, and the final judgment
rule proceeds upon the theory that it is better to impose upon the
complaining party the burden of a new trial, than to give him the
opportunity of causing even greater delay and expense to the other
party by several interlocutory appeals. In this respect, the discovery order presents no more persuasive reason for allowing
interlocutory appeal than does any other interlocutory order.
There is always the possibility that the party complaining of the
granting or denial of the discovery order will win on final judgment, so that an appeal will not be desired by him. Furthermore,
the erroneous granting or denial of the order may not, even though
the complaining party loses, have been prejudicial to his interests
at the trial. These factors are impossible of determination until
after the trial.
19 Id. § 25-1267.43. Although copied from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Nebraska discovery statutes omit the provision of Federal
Rule 37 (a) that a party may be required to answer questions propounded
on an interrogatory to a party. It is believed, however, that the inherent
power of the court to give effect to procedures provided for is sufficient
to enable the court to compel an answer. See Healey, Discovery and
Preparation for Trial, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 292, 298 (1953).
20 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.44 (Supp. 1955).
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We conclude that the delay and expense is not a persuasive
reason for allowing interlocutory appeals from them. But there
are other factors, inherent in discovery, which are more persuasive.
2.

Irreparable Injury.

Discovery procedures present a danger of injury which is not
found in the usual interlocutory order. The right to conduct
fishing expeditions, granted by the discovery rules, may give rise
to difficult questions concerning privilege, good cause, notice, and
intended scope of the discovery statutes. (For the purposes of
this discussion let us call the one seeking discovery the "inquirer,"
and the one against whom the discovery order runs the "withholder.") The order may erroneously require the withholder to
disclose matter which is privileged, such as a communication between attorney and client, 21 physician and patient,22 priest and
penitent,23 or husband and wife, 24 or matter tending to incriminate the withholder. 25 Questions involving, for example, whether
the attorney's "work product,"26 trade secrets,27 reports furnished
to parties by expert witnesses, 28 the coverage furnished by the
withholder's liability insurance policy,29 or the withholder's income tax return30 are proper subjects of discovery, may also arise.
When the withholder gives up information, it can never be
erased from the inquirer's knowledge. If the erroneously required
disclosure is an injury, it is an irreparable one. An appeal from
final judgment does not repair the injury. It attempts to shut
the gate after the cows are out, but unlike the cows, the information disclosed cannot be effectively brought back. This applies,
of course, only to the order granting discovery. 31
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1206 (Reissue 1948).
Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Id. § 25-1204.
25 Id. § 25-1210.
26 See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
21 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.22 (Supp. 1955) provides that the court
may, upon motion of a party or person to be examined on a deposition,
make an order that secret processes, developments, or research need not
be disclosed.
28 See 4 Moore, Federal Practice para. 26.24 (2d ed. 1950).
29 See, e.g., Jeppesen v. Swanson, 68 N.W.2d 649 (:Minn. 1955); Lund
v. Holbrook, 157 Neb. 854, 62 N.W.2d 112 (1954).
30 See Peterson v. Peterson, 70 S.D. 385, 17 N.W.2d 920 (1945) (income tax report in files of Internal Revenue Bureau privileged).
31 See discussion in Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 29-32,
62 N.W.2d 688, 698-699 (1954).
21
22
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The same concept, i.e., that the effect of error in granting
certain orders cannot be relieved on appeal from final judgment,
seems to be the basis for some of the exceptions made to the final
judgment by statute in many states.32 Interlocutory appeal is
quite commonly allowed by statute in cases involving, for example, injunctions, 33 partitions,34 receivership, 35 and attachment.36
It should be possible, by requiring the posting of bond, to protect
the pecuniary interests of parties pending appeal in many such
actions. But that sort of protection is hardly sufficient in cases
involving discovery, where the withholder may, as a result of
being required to disclose information, be subjected to criminal
prosecution where the privilege against self-incrimination is in32See discussion in Note, 58 Yale L.J. 1186, 1187 (1949).
33 Ariz. Code Ann. § 21-1702 (1939); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-2102 (1947);
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 963 (1953); Colo. R. Civ. P. lll(a) (3); Del. Const.
art. 4, § 11(4), (5); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 59.02 (Supp. 1955); Idaho Code
Ann. § 13-201 (1947); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110, § 78 (Supp. 1956); Kan.
Gen. Stat. § 60-3302 (1949); Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 5, § 31
(1951); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 214, § 19 (1955); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 512.020
(1949); lliont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 43-8003 (1947); Nev. Comp. Laws §
9385.60 (Supp. 1941); N.J. Sup. Ct. rule 2 :2-3 (a) ~1); N.D. Rev. Code
§ 28-2702 (1943); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 952 (Supp. 1955); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 12, §§ 1101, 1102 (1953); S.C. Code § 15-123 (1952); S.D. Code §
33.0701 (5) (1939); Tex. Stat., Rev. Civ. art. 4662, Tex. Stat., Civ. Proc.
rule 583 (1948); Va. Code § 8-462 (1950); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.88.010
(1951); W. Va. Code Ann.§ 5788(g)· (1949); Wis. Stat.§ 274.3~ (1953).
3!Ariz. Code Ann.§ 21-17·02 (1939); Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§ 963 (1953);
Del. Const. art. 4, § 11(4). (5); D.C. Code Ann. § 11-772 (1951); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 59.02 (Supp. 1955); Idaho Code Ann. § 13-201 (1947);
Mass. Ann. Laws c. 214, § 19 (1955); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 512.02 (1949);
Nev. Comp. Laws § 9385.60 (Supp. 1941); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1093
(1953); Va. Code§ 8-462 (1950); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5788(g).
3G Ariz. Code Ann. § 21-1702 (1939); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-2102 (1947);
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 963 (1953); Colo. R. Civ. P. lll(a)(4); Del.
Const. art. 4, § 11(4), (5); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 59.02 (Supp. 1955); Ill. Ann.
Stat. c. 110, § 78 (Supp. 1956); Kan. Gen. Stat. § 60-3302 (1949); Md.
Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 5, § 31 (1951); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 214, § 19
(1955); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 512.020 (1949); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 438003 (1947); Nev. Comp. Laws § 9385.60 (Supp. 1941); N.J. Sup. Ct.
Rule 2:2-3(a) (2); s.c. Code § 15-123 (1952); S.D. Code § 33.0701(5)
(1939); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.88.010 (1951).
3GDel. Const. art. 4, §'11(4), (5); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 59.02 (Supp. 1955);
Idaho Code Ann § 13-201 (1947); Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 5, § 31
(1951); lliass, Ann. Laws c. 214, § 19 (1955); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 605.09
(West 1948); lllont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 43-8003 (1947); Nev. Comp. Laws
§ 9385.60 (Supp. 1941); N.D. Rev. Code § 28-2702 (1943); Okla Stat. tit.
12, § 952 (Supp. 1955); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1108 (1953); S.D. Code
§ 33.0701(5) (1939); Va. Code § 8-462 (1950); Wash. Rev. Code §
4.88.010 (1951); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5788 (h) (1949); Wis. Stat. § 274.33
(1953).
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volved, the loss of business prospects where trade secrets are involved, the loss of the prospect of reasonable settlement in cases
where the coverage limits of an insurance policy are involved, or
the loss of an advantage at the trial where th~ matter sought to
be reached is the attorney's work-product, or the opposing party's
theory of the facts of the case. Whether disclosure of any of
these matters should or should not be required is not the immediate problem. The problem is rather to find a means of resolving
the issue of whether disclosure should be required, without causing irreparable injury to the withholder if the question happens
to have been wrongly decided in the trial court.
II.

METHODS OF AVOIDING THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE

A. Discover1J Sanctions
The sanctions provided by the discovery rules for their enforcement may provide a means of obtaining appellate review of
orders which are not immediately appealable. These sanctions
include: (1) a judgment of civil or criminal contempt, available
against either parties or non-parties ;37 (2) an order, against a
party, that the facts which the inquirer was attempting to establish by discovery be taken as established;38 (3) orders limiting
the introduction of evidence by the party against whom discovery
is sought ;39 ( 4) orders striking pleadings or parts thereof ;40 ( 5)
orders staying proceedings until the order is obeyed, (useful only
against a plaintiff) ;41 ( 6) orders dismissing the action where the
plaintiff refuses to comply ;42 and (7) orders rendering a default
judgment where the defendant refuses to comply.43
37Neb. Rev. Stat. § 1267.44(1) (Supp. 1955). Feµ. R. Civ. P. 37(b)
provides not only that refusal to answer a question on a deposition may
be considered contempt, but that an order directing arrest may be used as
a sanction for the disobedience of any discovery order except one for physical or mental examination The Nebraska statute omits the latter sanction. There seems little doubt, however, that contempt may be used as
a sanction for the disobedience of any discovery order, apparently even
one for a mental or physical examination, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2121
(3) (Reissue 1948), the general contempt statute.
38 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.44 (2) (a); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (2)
(i).

39 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.44 (2) (b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (2)
(ii).
40

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.44(2) (c); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2)

(iv).
Ibid.
Ibid.
43 Ibid.
41
42
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1.

Finality of Orders Imposing Sanctions.

The opportunity for a party or witness to get review of a
discovery order by appeal from any of these orders imposing
sanctions depends upon whether the order imposing the sanction
is final. An order dismissing the action, or rendering default
judgment is clearly final, and therefore immediately appealable;H
The others are not final, and therefore not immediately appealable, 4u with the exception of a judgment of contempt.
When civil or criminal contempt is the sanction used for enforcement of a discovery order, a petition in error may be used to
review the order in Nebraska.46 In the federal courts, if a judgment of contempt is construed as being entirely civil in character,
and runs against a party of record, it is not appealable except
in connection with a final judgment or order.47 A non-party
may, of course, appeal from either civil or criminal contempt
judgments, since he cannot take an appeal from final judgment.
In Nebraska, review is allowed by petition in error in both civil
and criminal contempt cases whether the contempt judgment is
H See Davis v. Jennings, 78 Neb. 412, 111 N.W. 128 (1907) (dismissal
of action without prejudice held to be final order and appealable). There
appear to be no Nebraska cases on the question of whether a default judgment entered for failure to comply with a discovery order or other order of
the court is final and appealable. But see Anson v. Kruse, 147 Neb. 989,
25 N.W.2d 896 (1947) holding that an order overruling a demurrer is
not final, and that no appeal will be allowed from it unless defendant
elects to stand on his demurrer and submit to the rendition of a judgment
against him. This is substantially the same situation as that presented
by a defendaat's election to stand on his refusal to comply with a discovery order and submit to the rendition of a default judgment against
him. See also 4 Moore, Federal Practice para. 26.37[2] (2d ed. 1950).
4G See State ex r~l. Sorenson v. State Bank of Omaha, 131 Neb. 223,
267 N.W. 532 (1936) (order sustaining motion to strike part of answer
not final and not appealable) ; Welch v. Calhoun, 22 Neb. 166, 34 N.W.
349 (1887) (order sustaining motion to strike amended petition from the
files not an appealable order). See also 4 Moore, Federal Practice para.
26.37[2] (2d ed. 1950).
46 Appeal from a judgment of contempt may be taken only by petition
in error, Frye v. Frye, 158 Neb. 694, 64 N.W.2d 648 (1954); Gross v.
Garfield County, 145 Neb. 414, 16 N.W.2d 850 (1944); Whipple v. Nelson,
138 Neb. 514, 293 N.W. 382 (1940); Maryott v. State, 124 Neb. 274, 246
N.W. 343 (1933); Gentle v. Pante! Realty Co., 120 Neb. 630, 234 N.W.
574 (1931); Hawthorne v. State, 45 Neb. 871, 64 N.W. 359 (1895).
Habeas Corpus will lie to review only the question of whether the imprisonment order is void, and the question of whether the contempt judgment is merely in error is not raised, In re Niklaus, 144 Neb. 503, 13
N.W.2d 655 (1944); Cain v. Miller, 109 Neb. 441, 191 N.W. 704 (1922).
47 Dickinson v. Rinke, 132 F.2d 884, 885 (2d Cir. 1943).
See also
In re Eskay, 122 F.2d 819, 824 ( 2d Cir. 1941).
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against a party or a non-party. 48 A party in the action, of course,
cannot appeal from a judgment of contempt against a witness,
since he is not a party to the contempt action.49
It is obvious, then, that the trial court has the power to allow
review of an interlocutory order by using against the one desiring review a discovery sanction which employs a final order.
2.

Utility of Review by Appeal from Final Discovery Sanctions.

This method of review is not without disadvantages. An appeal from a default judgment or dismissal of the action may involve the risk that if the withholder loses on appeal, res judicata
will apply to the merits. For plaintiffs, this difficulty may be
avoided by a dismissal without prejudice to bringing another action.50 But whether to dismiss with or without prejudice is discretionary with the trial judge51 and the decision may depend on
his feeling as to whether the plaintiff is justified in refusing to
comply with the discovery order. Even this uncertain means of
side-stepping the res judicata problem is not available in advance
for a defendant against whom a default judgment is entered. If
an appeal from the final judgment of default is decided before
the end of the term at which it was rendered, which seems unlikely, and the defendant loses on appeal, he might apply to have
the default judgment vacated, agree to comply with the discovery
order, and be allowed to proceed with his defense on the merits/'::
There is no guarantee, of course, that he would be allowed to do
this. If the appeal is not decided until after the trial court term
has ended, there is apparently no way for the defendant to get
his default judgment vacated. 53
Maryott v. State, 124 Neb. 274, 246 N.W. 343 (1933).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2301 (Reissue 19'48) ("When a person shall be
convicted of an offense . . . the court may, on application of the person so
convicted, suspend the execution of the sentence . . . for such period .
as will give the person so convicted a reasonable time to apply for [a
writ of error] . . . . ").
uo Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-601 (Reissue 1948).
51 Ferson v . .Armour & Co., 109 Neb. 648, 192 N.W. 125 (1923); Howell
v. Malmgren, 79 Neb. 16, 112 N.W. 313 (1907).
52 See Barney v. Platte Valley P.P. & I. Dist., 147 Neb. 376, 23 N.W.2d
335 (1946) (district court has inherent power during term to vacate a
default judgment).
53 If the appeal resulted in a decision that the discovery order was correctly grantea, the withholder would have none of the grounds set forth in
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001 (Reissue 1948) for vacating a judgment after
term.
48

49
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Another disadvantage in this manner of achieving review is
that it is only available when parties to the action are involved,
since dismissals and default judgments can be used only when
the withholder is a party. Contempt is probably available as a
sanction against either parties or non-parties, and does provide
a means of review free from concern about res judicata. It also
has its disadvantages. Of course, if the procedure is being used
merely as a means to get review of the order, and the judge is
satisfied there is considerable question about his decision, the
penalty for contempt may be only nominal. This has been done
both in Nebraska and in the federal courts.04 When this is not
the situation, the withholder may have to go to jail. The village
doctor cannot, however honorable his motives, occupy the county
jail in order to preserve the privilege of his client, who may not
even be involved in the pending action. Lawyers may find themselves in the same position, as might also clergymen, or any one
else from whom privileged information is sought. As a social
matter, it would seem that no one ought to be required to stand
in contempt of court to get review of a discovery order, if an unsettled legal question exists, and if there is reason to believe that
disclosure might irreparably injure the withholder, or perhaps his
confider.m; In that situation it is the conduct of the judge, and
not the person against whom the order runs, which should be the
subject of appellate concern.
Thus we have a means of review by appeal from final judgments arising out of discovery sanctions, but it is submitted that
these means of review are inadequate. The default judgment and
dismissal techniques are inadequate because they appy only to
parties and involve res judicata, and contempt is inadequate because of its harshness. Furthermore, the type of sanction used
should depend upon the importance to the inquirer's case of being
able to get discovery, not upon whether the judge is uncertain as
to the propriety of the discovery order. To make the type of
sanction used depend on the latter factor would lead to the use
of the most stringent of the sanctions, i.e., dismissal, default,
or contempt, where the judge is least sure of the correctness of
the discovery order.
1a See State v. Rice, 157 Neb. 579, 60 N.W.2d 668 (1953), where the
penalty for contempt was a fine of $1; and Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495 (1947).
r;:; See Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 31-32, 62 N.W.2d
688, 698-699 (1954) ("It seems extremely harsh to require a litigant to
subject himself to a contempt proceeding before a matter of this kind may
be reviewed effectively.'').
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B. Extraordinary Remedies
Another means of getting review of a discovery order may
be by the use of an extraordinary remedy. Those applicable to
this question are prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari.
1. Prohibition.
An ancient common law writ, prohibition is issued by a superior court to an inferior court commanding that the latter cease
from exceeding its jurisdiction.56 While mandamus requires an
official to perform some act or duty within his jurisdiction, prohibition requires a court to refrain from doing something outside
its jurisdiction.57 Being extraordinary in its nature, prohibition
lies at the discretion of the court which issues it, and will lie only
where ordinary proceedings at law, in equity, or by appeal will
not redress the grievance.5s It is a preventive, rather than a
corrective remedy, and traditionally will not lie to review mere
error. 59 The requisite for its use is usually considered to be a
"jurisdictional over-reaching'' on the part of the inferior court.00
Because of this, prohibition is not ordinarily considered a proper
procedure for the review of discovery orders.
In some states, however, prohibition has been used to review
the granting of discovery orders, either by statutory construe-

561\fassman Construction Co. v. Nebraska \Vork. Comp. Ct., 141 Neb.
270, 3 N.W.2d 639 (1942); State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676,
276 N.W. 676 (1937); 3 Blackstone, Commentaries *112; High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies 706-707 (3d ed. 1895).
57 " ..• In a general sense they are counterparts of each other in their
object and purpose, but only to the extent that one is prohibitory and the
other mandatory; one acts on the person, the other acts on the tribunal.
. . . Prohibition [however] is not an affirmative remedy like mandamus,
but purely negative, for it commands not that something be done, but that
something be left undone." 42 Am. Jur., Prohibition § 3 at 140 (1942);
High op. cit. supra note 56 at 708.
5SHigh, op. cit. supra note 56, at 717; State ex rel. Wright v. Barney,
133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676 (1937).
59 4 Moore, Federal Practice para. 26.37 ( 4) (2d ed. 1948); High, op.
cit. supra note 5 6 at 717.
60 Ibid.
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tion, 61 by court rule, 62 or by merely disregarding the "jurisdictional over-reaching" requirement. 63
In Nebraska, even disregarding the jurisdictional requirement, prohibition would apparently not be available for the review of discovery orders granted by a district court. The Nebraska Supreme Court at one time indicated that the writ of
prohibition was abolished in N ebraska. 134 Later it was decided
that the writ was available, but was not within the original jurisdiction of the supreme court. 65 This would appear to make prohibition available only for the review of the actions of courts inferior to the district court. Since discovery procedures are presumably available in the inferior courts in Nebraska, 66 the writ
of prohibition may be available to review the granting of discovery orders in those courts. However, prohibition has seldom
61 Comment, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 124 (1953) discusses the use of the
statutory writ of prohibition as a means of reviewing various interlocutory orders. The statutory requirement that before the writ of prohibition will lie, the inferior court must have acted "without or in excess of
its jurisdiction" is construed to include "any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance" so that prohibition will lie for
"mere error." See, however, Superior Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,
37 Cal.2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951) which held that mandamus is the
proper means for vacating a discovery order.
62 See Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954) allows review
of a discovery order under Ky. Ct. App. Rule 1.420, which seems to merge
the common law writs of prohibition and mandamus.
63 See, e.g., Jeppesen v. Swanson, 68 N.W.2d 649 (Minn. 1955) where
prohibition was used to review a discovery order, without discussion of
the propriety of the use of prohibition, apparently relying on a suggestion
in Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 29-32, 62 N.W.2d 688,
698-699 (1954) that prohibition might be available for this purpose. Both
the Jeppesen and Brown opinions were by Justice Knutson.
4 l\Ioore, Federal Practice para. 26.37(7) (2d ed. 1948) suggests a
relaxation of the "jurisdictional" requirement in the area of pre-trial discovery orders, but the federal courts do not seem in sympathy with this
view. See Bank Line v. United States, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947);
Terminal Ry. Ass'n v. Moore, 145 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1944).
IH State ex rel. King v. Hall, 47 Neb. 579, 66 N.W. 642 (1896) held
that prohibition was not within the original jurisdiction of the Nebraska
Supreme Court. This was apparently taken to mean that it was not within the jurisdiction of any Nebraska court. See State ex rel. Parmenter v.
Troup, 98 Neb. 333, 334, 152 N.W. 748 (1915) ("The common law writ
of prohibition is abolished in this state. . . . ").
6~State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676 (1934).
oo Neb. Rev. stat. §§ 24-502, 26-1201, 26-206, 27-1801 (Reissue 1948)
make the provisions of the code of civil procedure (chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes) applicable to proceedings before justices of the
peace, county courts, and municipal courts. Apparently this would include
the discovery procedures.
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been used in any court in Nebraska, and it is impossible to pre<lict whether or not the jurisdictional over-reaching requirement
would be disregarded.
2.

Certiorari

The writ of certiorari has been abolished in Nebraska,61 but
it should be noted that several jurisdictions, including Florida, 68
Iowa, 69 Montana,7° Rode Island,71 Utah,72 Washington,73 and Wisconsin74 have used it for the review of discovery orders.
3.

Mandamus

At least four states have used mandamus for the review
of discovery orders. They are Alabama, 75 California,76 Michigan,77 and Oklahoma.78 Mandamus may be available to a limited
extent for that purpose in Nebraska. The reasons for the belief
that mandamus may be available, and the possible limitations on
its use, form the remainder of our discussion of the eA'traordinary
remedies.
67 Neb.

Rev. Stat. § 25-1930 (Reissue 1948).
Kilgore v. Bird, 149 Fla. 570, 6 So.2d 541 (1942), establishes that
certiorari is the proper remedy to review discovery orders, rather than
prohibition.
69 Neufeld v. Jordan, 240 Iowa 1063, 38 N.W.2d 601 (1949); Chandler
v. Taylor, 234 Iowa 287, 12 N.W.2d 590 (1944); l\Iain v. Ring, 219 Iowa
1270, 260 N.W. 859 (1935); Fairbanks l\Iorse & Co. v. District Court,
215 Iowa 703, 247 N.W. 203 (1933); Iowa Farm Credit Corp. v. Hutchison, 207 Iowa 453, 223 N.W. 271 (1929); Davis v. District Court, 195
Iowa 688, 192 N.W. 852 (1923).
70 State ex rel. Pitcher v. District Court, 114 l\Iont. 128, 133 P.2d 350
(1943); State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 112 l\Iont. 506, 118 P.2d
141 (1941); and see State ex rel. Boston & Montana, etc., Co. v. District
Court, 27 Mont. 441, 71 Pac. 602 (1903).
71 See Broadway Furniture Co. v. Superior Court, 123 Atl. 566 (R.I.
1924).
12 Olson v. District Court, 93 Utah 145, 71 P.2d 529 (1937).
73 State ex rel. Bronson v. Superior Court, 194 Wash. 339, 77 P.2d 997
(1938).
74 State ex rel. Walling v. Sullivan, 245 Wis. 180, 13 N.W.2d 550 (1944).
75 Ex Parte Benson, 243 Ala. 435, 10 So.2d 482 (1942); Ex Parte
Pollard, 233 Ala. 335, 171 So. 628 (1936).
76 Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749, 235 P.2d 833
(1951); McCarty v, Superior Court, 30 Cal.App. 1, 159 Pac. 736 (1935);
Shell Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 75, 292 Pac. 531 (1930).
For general discussion, see Comment, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 102 (1950).
11 Klett v. Hickey, 310 Mich. 329, 17 N.W.2d 201 (1945); Hallett v.
Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 298 Mich. 582, 299 N.W. 723 (1941); International Harvester Co. v. Smith, 163 l\Iich. 55, 127 N.W. 695 (1910);
78 State ex rel. Westerheide v. Shilling, 190 Okla. 305, 123 P.2d 674
(1942) (review of order denying discovery).
68
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As indicated, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. By
statute in Nebraska, it will lie only to compel performance by an
inferior court or public official of an act which the law "specifically enjoins" as a duty. It will not lie to control judicial discretion, nor will it lie where there is a "plain and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law." 79
In State ex rel. Parmenter v. Troup, 80 mandamus was used
to review a discovery order. A district court had dismissed a
personal injury action without prejudice upon the plaintiff's refusal to comply with an order requiring her to submit to a physical examination. The plaintiff sought mandamus to require the
district court to reinstate her action. It was argued that mandamus did not lie because there was an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law by appeal from the order dismissing the
action. The court held that appeal was not an adequate remedy
because it might result in such delay as to practically defeat the
plaintiff's action, even if she won on appeal. This holding was
apparently based on the plaintiff's argument that it would take
two years, under ordinary appeal procedure, merely to obtain
a trial of the action.81
If the Troup case is to be given any weight, there would be
many situations where the remedy in the ordinary course of law
would not be adequate. Where, as in the Troup case, mandamus
is sought after the imposition of a sanction embodying a final
order, mandamus would present little advantage over an appeal
from the final order, whether it be dismissal, with or without
prejudice, rendition of a default judgment, or a judgment of contempt, except insofar as it allows a more speedy review. Since
both mandamus actions and ordinary appeals can both be advanced
on the docket of the supreme court,82 mandamus has no advantage in that respect. Mandamus might present an advantage in
that it would be unnecessary to wait for the preparation of a
transcript and bill of exceptions such as would be required on
appeal.

Where the sanction used to enforce compliance with the discovery order is a non-final order, review by mandamus would save
a re-trial of the action by getting the discovery question decided
before the trial. But this does not seem to be regarded as sufw Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2156 (Reissue 1948).
so 98 Neb. 333, 152 N.W. 748 (1915).
s1 Brief for Relator, p. 15, State ex rel. Parmenter v. Troup, 98 Neb.
333, 152 N.W. 748 (1915).
s2 Neb. Sup. Ct. Rule 16.
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ficient reasons for regarding the remedy by appeal as inadequate.83
There is, of course, the possibility in this situation that the withholder will win the action on the merits in the trial court.
The statutory requirement that there be a duty specifically
enjoined by law in order for mandamus to be proper is in part
the obverse of the statutory limitation that mandamus will not
lie to control judicial discretion. It is more than that, however.
It also involves the judicially construed rule that mandamus will
not lie to review mere error,84 nor to require a court to undo that
which it has already done. 85
As they are stated in the Nebraska cases, however, these
latter rules concerning "mere error" and undoing what has already
been done are almost always coupled with a statement of the rule
that mandamus will not lie where there is an adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.86 There seems to be no statutory
connection between these rules, but a reading of the cases suggsts that the operative rule is that mandamus will not lie to correct mere error or to undo things already done unless the remedy
in the ordinary course of law is inadequate. In the Troup case,
for example, mandamus was said to be proper because the remedy
by appeal was inadequate. Had the plaintiff succeeded on the
merits, the issuance of mandamus would have compelled the trial
court to undo what it had already done because of a mere error.
The court also said that mandamus was proper because prohibition was "abolished," but it seems doubtful that the action of the
83 See, e.g., State ex rel. Garton v. Fulton, 118 Neb. 400, 225 N.W. 28
( 19 2 9), where the defendant in a criminal case demanded a jury trial in
the county court. The county court denied it, and the district court issued
a peremptory writ of mandamus, holding unconstitutional the statute under
which jury trial was denied. The supreme court held that mandamus
would not lie because there was an adequate remedy by appeal from final
judgment.
84 See State ex. rel. Garton v. Fulton, 118 Neb. 400, 410, 225 N.W. 28,
32 (1929) ("Mandamus will lie to compel an inferior court to hear and
determine a cause, if within its jurisdiction and when properly brought
into the court. Mandamus will not lie to coerce judicial discretion of an
inferior court, nor to predetermine the character of the judgment that the
court shall enter. Mandamus will not issue to review the action of an
inferior court when there is an adequate remedy at law, and the writ may
not be used to usurp or take the place of an appeal or writ of error.");
State ex rel. Cohn v. Jessen, 66 Neb. 515, 519, 92 N.W. 584, 596 (1902).
85 See State ex rel. Ensey v. Churchill, 37 Neb. 702, 704, 56 N.W. 484,
485 (1893); State ex rel. North American Cattle Co. v. l\IcGee, 32 Neb.
149, 151, 49 N.W. 220, 222 (1891).
86 Supra notes 84, 85.
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trial court would today be considered a jurisdictional over-reaching, so prohibition would not lie anyhow.
So also, in State ex rel. Goff v. Dodge County,87 mandamus
was used to compel a county board to correct errors where it appeared that the board falsely made up the record to show that
evidence was received when no evidence had actually been received, thus preventing, as pointed out by the reviewing court,
review by appeal or error.
Thus where mandamus is sought to review the granting of
a discovery order, it could be argued that mandamus is proper,
regardless of whether it is for the review of mere error, or to
compel undoing what has been done, it if appears that the remedy
by appeal is not adequate. If, however, mandamus is sought before the imposition of a sanction, it would be impossible to determine what type of sanction the trial judge plans to use to compel compliance, so that it could not be determined whether the
remedy by appeal was inadequate.
All this is not to say, however, that the Nebraska court would
hold mandamus to be a proper remedy for the review of discovery
orders even when a sanction had been entered. The concept that
mandamus will lie to review "mere error" where there is not an
adequate remedy at law has no basis in the Nebraska mandamus
statute, and has never been positively stated in the cases. It is
particularly doubtful that the court would hold mandamus proper
for review of orders granting discovery in view of its apparent
reluctance to decide such questions even when properly presented
by petition in error from a contempt judgment.88
20 Neb. 595, 31 N.W. 117 (1887).
ss See State v. Rice, 157 Neb. 579, 60 N.W.2d 668 (1953), a proceeding
in error from a judgment of contempt arising out of a deposition with
subpoena duces tecum and involving the questions of the attorney's workproduct and the defendant's insurance coverage. The notice for the deposition was defective, but this point was not raised by the parties on
appeal. The court, however, seized upon this point and threw out the
deposition, without even mentioning Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.32 (Supp.
1955) which provides: "All errors and irregularities in the notice for
taking a deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served
upon the party giving the notice." No objection, written or oral, was
made until the taking of the deposition. The witness refused to testify,
and objected that the taking of the deposition was " . . . not in accordance
with the Statutes of the State of Nebraska." Not until the party taking
the deposition moved that the matter be certified to the district court and
that the witness be charged with contempt did the witness object to the
notice. The court does not say whether this objection was in writing.
87
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STATUTORY l\!ODIFICATION OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
TO PROVIDE FOR REVIEW OF ORDERS GRANTING DISCOVERY

From the preceding discussion it appears that there is in
Nebraska no satisfactory procedure for the review of orders
granting discovery. The use of discovery sanctions which are in
themselves final orders provides a means of review which is available in the discretion of the trial court. But the use of these
final orders is attended with substantial risk because res judicata
applies to the merits in the case of default judgments or dismissals with prejudice. Further, the use of final sanction orders
against non-parties is limited to contempt judgments. Prohibition is not available for use in actions brought in the district
court, where discovery procedures are most frequently used, because it is not within the original jurisdiction of the supreme
court. The availability of prohibition for review of orders granting discovery in actions in courts inferior to the district court
is doubtful because of the jurisdictional over-reaching requirement. Mandamus is likewise of uncertain availability, although
within the original jurisdiction of the supreme court, because of
the rule that it will not lie to review mere error or to enforce a
duty not specifically enjoined by law.
Legislation would seem to be needed to remove the uncertainty which exists as to what means of reviewing discovery
orders is available. The requisites for a procedure for review
of orders granting discovery seem fairly obvious. It should, of
course, avoid the evils which the final judgment rule is designed
to avoid. It must also keep to a minimum the opportunities for
obstructing the use of discovery procedures.
An examination of the procedures adopted in some jurisdictions, by statute or court rule, and suggested for adoption in
other jurisdictions, allowing appeal from interlocutory orders
before final judgment, reveals a wide range of variations. The
procedures may be classified as follows
A.

Appeal as of right ;s9

B. Appeal on leave granted by
I

1.

the trial court, in its discretion,
a. on motion of a party,90 or

See notes 33, 34, 35, and 36 supra.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 490.9, 502.20, 547.30 (1955); Mass. Ann.
Laws c. 214, § 30, c. 215, § 13, c. 231, § 111 (1955); Minn. Stat. Ann. §605.09 (1947) (orders overruling demurrers); Miss. Code Ann. § 114$.
89
90

•
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b.
2. an
a.
b.
c.
d.

at the joint request of all the parties, 93 or
appellate court, in its discretion,
on motion of a party,92 or
at the joint request of all parties, 21 or
after leave granted by the trial court,94' or
after leave denied by the trial court.95

We shall discuss here the mechanics of the operation of these
procedures, with a view toward suggesting a procedure which
would operate satisfactorily for review of discovery orders in
Nebraska.
A.

Appeal as of Right.

One of the benefits of discovery procedure is that it expedites
the disposal of litigation by exposing sham claims and defenses,
and by reducing the issues at the trial to those over which there
is a real conflict. Another benefit is to make easy and inexpensive the proof of facts which would otherwise be difficult and
expensive to prove.96 Probably one of the basic benefits also is
the possibility that the withholder, realizing he can be forced to
disclose information, will do so upon request without requiring
the inquirer to use the discovery procedures. To give the withholder the right to an appeal, before final judgment, from every
order granting discovery, would give the withholder a delaying
weapon which might greatly reduce the effectiveness of the discovery procedures in producing these benefits, which is the very
evil against which the final judgment rule is designed to guard.
For this reason, appeal as of right is unsuitable as a procedure for
review of orders granting discovery.
(1942) (specified decrees and orders in equity); R.I. Gen. Laws c. 545,
§ 5 (1938), R.I. Public Laws c. 545, § 6 (1940); Vt. Rev. Stat. § 2124
(1947); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5788 (1949) (questions arising on sum-

mons or pleadings) .

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7967 (1949).
Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110, § 101.30 (Supp. 1956) (order granting a new
trial); Iowa R. Civ. P. 332(a); La. Code Prac. Ann. art. 566, (1942);
N.J. App. Div. rule 2:2-3(a) (4), (b); N.Y. Civ. Prac. act. § 589; S.D.
Code § 33.0701(6) (1939); Utah R. Civ. P. 72(b).
03 W. Va. Code Ann. § 5788 (1949).
SH Del Sup. Ct. rule 20(2) (a), (b), (c), Del. Super. Ct. (Civ.) rule
75, Del. Ch. Ct. Rule 72(b).
9o Miss. Code Ann. § 1148 (1942).
9G See 4 1\Ioore, Federal Practice para. 26.02 at 1014-1016 (2d ed. 1950)
for an outline of the benefits of discovery procedure.
91
92
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Appeal by Leave of Court

The method of interlocutory appeal which leaves allowance
of the appeal to the discretion of some court, either trial, appellate,
or both, would seem to be better than an appeal as of right, so
far as concerns the review of orders granting discovery. Some
jurisdictions which use this type of procedure impose limitations
upon the exercise of the court's discretion in allowing the appeal.
Since the justification for an appeal from orders granting discovery is that there appears a likelihood that irreparable injury
will result from an erroneous determination of the law by the
trial court, there should also be a requirement that there is a
likelihood that the trial court has determined the law incorrectly,
i.e., that the order raises a question of law ·.vhich is unsettled in
the jurisdiction.
The problem in the area of interlocutory appeals by leave of
coart which has provoked the most heated discussion is whether
the trial court or an appellate court should make the decision as
to whether an interlocutory appeal should be allowed in a particular case.97
It has been suggested, in favor of vesting discretion in the
trial court to allow the appeal, that the trial judge is better qualified, through a more intimate knowledge of the facts of the case,
to decide whether appeal should be allowed to avoid irreparable
injury, and that this would avoid interrupting the progress of
the case to decide whether appeal should be allowed. 08 Certainly
this procedure would avoid the objection made to the appeal as
of right that the appellate courts would be swamped with appeals.
provided the trial judge has sufficient objectivity to decide which
appeals should be allowed and which should not. A too timid
judge might allow almost every appeal asked. This could be controlled, however, by also giving the appellate court discretion to
deny the right to appeal after it has been granted by the trial
court.
If, however, the trial judge were to be e},,-tremely hesitant
about allowing appeals from his rulings, either because he is con-

01 For discussions of this topic, principally in connection with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b), see Comment, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 1106, 1111 (1950); Note,
15 So. Calif. L. Rev. 504, 512 (1942); Note, 58 Yale L.J. 1186, 11901192 (1949); Note, 55 Yale L.J. 141, 149 (1946).
ossee Note, 15 So. Calif. L. Rev. 504, 512 (1942).

488

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

vinced that the order is correct99 or because he feels that interlocutory appeals are generally unwise, a procedure which provided
review of his decision not to allow the appeal might unduly burden
the appellate court.
Appli~tions for leave to appeal might also be unduly burdensome under a procedure by which the decision of whether to
allow the appeal lay initially with the appellate court. Although
the court could control the number of appeals it heard, it could
not easily control the number of applications for leave to appeal
without laying down rather specific standards which would destroy the flexibility needed in determining whether, in any given
case, irreparable injury is likely.

The wisdom of laying down specific standards is involved
where the determination of whether the appeal should be allowed
is at the trial court level. If discretion to allow appeals is in
the trial judge, one judge may be much more liberal in allowing
appeals than another.100 The only way to avoid this difficulty is
to set down specific standards for the allowance of appeals, or
to provide for complete review of the trial court's determination.
These considerations led the Judicial Conference of the United
States, in considering the advisability of a procedure for interlocutory appeals, to recommend a procedure allowing appeal in
the discretion of the court of appeals after a finding by the district court, in issuing an order, that the order involved:
" . . . a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. . . . "101

This proposal was directed toward the early disposition of questions which would be controlling in anti-trust and similar protracted litigation. The same body disapproved a proposal which
would have given the courts of appeals discretion to allow the
appeal with the comment that it would " . . . unduly encourage
fragmentary and frivolous appeals with the evils and delays in99 See Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940, 952 (2d Cir. 1947) (concurring
opinion by Judge Frank, " . . . experience teaches that a trial judge, mistakenly convinced that his order is flawless and that an appeal would be
useless, may well be unwilling to expedite its review. . . . "); Note, 15 So.
Calif. L. Rev. 504, 506 (1942).
100 Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1947), citing as an example
the lack of uniformity among federal district judges in sentencing. See
also Note, 15 So Calif. L. Rev. 504, 512 (1942).
101 Jud. Conf. U.S . .Ann. Rep. 27 (1953).
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cident thereto. . . ."102 It might be doubted that the number of
appeals from orders granting discovery in Nebraska would be
such as to "swamp" the Nebraska Supreme Court with appeals if
discretion to allow interlocutory appeals were given that court,
but it is impossible to predict whether a procedure for interlocutory appeals would be used merely for delay. Perhaps the best
way to accomplish the purpose of preventing irreparable injury
resulting from an incorrect determination of the law by the trial
court in granting a discovery order, yet avoiding "fragmentary
and frivolous" appeals, is a procedure somewhat like that suggested by the Judicial Conference, with however, the decision of
the trial court limited to and conclusive on the question of whether
irreparable injury is likely to result. The supreme court would
be left the question of whether there was substantial ground for
difference of opinion as to the law. This would both give uniformity in the allowance of appeals, and prevent overburdening
of the supreme court, while taking advantage of the better knowledge of the facts by the trial court on the question of whether
there was likely to be irreparable injury.
A finding by either the trial or appellate court that there
were not sufficient grounds for an interlocutory appeal should
have the effect of foreclosing review of the propriety of the order
granting discovery on appeal from final judgment, since such
review would be too late to prevent injury anyhow.
Where the parties are agreed that irreparable injury may
result from enforcement of the discovery order, a stipulation
should be allowed to take the place of the trial court's finding,
as on any other issue of fact.
In order to make the appeal speedy and inexpensive, there
should be only a short time allowed after the order is entered for
the application for leave to appeal to be made. After a finding
by the trial court that the appeal is necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the supreme court should have power to determine
the manner and time within which the application for leave to
appeai must be submitted to it. Such appeal could, if necessary,
be advanced on the docket of the supreme court.
In the discussion of the proposed procedure for interlocutory
appeals from orders granting discovery, we have assumed that
the order is granted by the district court, and appeal would be
to the supreme court. Where the order is granted by a court inferior to the district court, it is possible that prohibition, which
102

Jud. Conf. U.S. Ann. Rep. 203 (1952).
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is within the jurisdiction of the district court, may lie to review
the order. If prohibition is available, it would seem to be adequate for the review of such orders, and until its availability has
been determined, we make no suggestion as to whether a procedure for interlocutory appeal should be provided for inferior
courts.
CONCLUSION

It is submitted that the means presently existing for review
of orders granting discovery in the district court in Nebraska are
inadequate, and that the procedure here would provide a satisfactory means of review without overburdening the supreme
court or appreciably interfering with the use of discovery procedures in Nebraska.
William H. Sherwood, '56
Clark Nichols, Jr., '56

